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COMMENTS
PICKETING OF THIRD PARTIES TO INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES
IN NEW YORK 1
The past several decades, pregnant with the seeds of social unrest among
the laboring classes, have given birth to profound changes in the status and
conditions of employment of those who labor in our modern economic vineyard.
Rights historically proclaimed are presently being put to practice. "For in
vain would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were
no method of recovering and asserting those rights, when wrongfully with-
held or invaded."'2 These elementary observations are within the experience
of even the most unlearned. But the innumerable legal problems which stem
from the recognition as a practical reality of labor's right to strike and bargain
collectively, for example, bid fair to create enigmas in the law great enough
to confuse even the most scholarly laborers after judicial truth. The acknowl-
edgement of labor's right to strike, has led to an admission that labor may
picket in order to publicize, and thereby gain popular support of, the end for
which the strike was called. 3 The right to picket raises the question: Against
whom may the picketing be directed? And, again, to what extent, if any, may
the so-called area of free discussion in industrial disputes be defined and
judicially determined so as to safeguard property rights of innocent third
parties caught in the web of conflicting interests of the disputants, without
circumscribing the constitutional guarantees of free speech? 4 It is the purpose
of this article to analyze the approach to this problem adopted by the New
York courts.
1. This Comment is intended to supplement and bring down to date a Comment on
the subject of picketing published-in the Fordham Law Review some time ago. Comment
(1940) 9 FoRanwm L. REv. 95-111. In the present article, the spotlight of legal analysis
will be focused upon the law relative to picketing of third parties to industrial disputes.
2. 1 BL. Comm. *56. Cf. also, Andrews, J., in Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y.
260i-265, 157 N. E. 130, 133 (1927).
3. "Members of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a State,
make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution." Brandeis, j., in Senn v. Tile Layers' Union, 301 U. S. 468, 478
(1937). Cf. also opinion of Murphy, J., in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 102
(1940). The problem in all these cases, however, is in determining the bounds of the
dispute, and the corresponding sphere in which picketing is lawful.
4. ". . . deprivation of these essential liberties cannot be reconciled with the rights
guaranteed to the people of this Nation by their Constitution." Black, J., dissenting in
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, 317 (1941). See
Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment (1926) 39 HARv. L. Rxv.
431. Cf. also, N. Y. CONST. Art. 1, § 8; N. Y. LABOR RELAT Os AcT, N. Y. Laws 1937,
c. 443, N. Y. LABOR LAW §§ 700-715.
5. Emphasis will be laid on recent developments in the law relative to picketing of
third parties generally, and specifically, reference will be made to a recent Court of Appeals
decision as indicative of the modem trend in the law.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
In a recent case before the New York Court of Appeals, People v. Muller,'
the defendant, member of the Electrical Workers' Union Local No. 3, which
was engaged in a bona fide labor dispute with the National Wiring & Pro-
tective Company7 (lessor of complainant's burglar alarm system), was con-
victed of the crime of disorderly conduct8 in that he picketed the premises of
the complainant, a retail haberdasher, in whose shop one of the systems had
been installed in 1935, under a self-renewing lease. The terms of the lease
included an incidental agreement for exclusive servicing of the alarm by the
lessor. The stipulated facts concede that the picketing was conducted in a
peaceful" and orderly manner, and it is likewise conceded that employees of
complainant are not involved in the controversy. The majority of the court
held, in a four-three decision, that "the picketing is for the purpose of pro-
moting the lawful interests of a labor union in a labor dispute", 10 and the
court thereupon affirmed the order reversing the defendant's conviction of dis-
orderly conduct. In a well reasoned dissent, Judge Finch argued that "the
picketing of this ultimate consumer, who is not engaged in the industry in which
the labor dispute has arisen, provides a true secondary boycott which has
always been held an unlawful labor objective and which this court has recently
condemned.""
The fundamental question in this case was whether a shopkeeper who has
leased a burglar alarm system from the vendor-manufacturer becomes a party
to a labor dispute12 between the manufacturer and his employees, by virtue
6. 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941). Hereinafter referred to, in both the
text and footnotes, as the Muller case.
7. National Wiring & Protective Company. is hereinafter referred to as the Company;
the Electrical Workers Union is called simply the Union.
8. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 722, provides: "Any person who with intent to provoke a
breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any
of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly con-
duct. . .. (2) Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be
offensive to others."
9. Where picketing has been accompanied by violence, the courts have been unanimous
in restraining it. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287
(1941); May's Furs & Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. (2d)
279 (1940).
10. The Muller case, Lehman, Ch. 3., at 284.
11. The Muller case, Finch, 3., dissenting at 289.
12. In determining the area of a "labor dispute" for the purpose of defining the rights
of parties to such controversies, the New York Courts have adopted, in actions at law
as well as in equity, the definitions enacted by the legislature in the New York anti-injunc-
tion statute, N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 477, N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 876-a. The New York statute
is modeled closely after the Federal Norris-LaGuardia Act, which the federal courts had
previously made use of in determining the issue of a "labor dispute" regardless of the nature
of the action. 47 STAT. 70-73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (Supp. 1938).
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1935) § 876-a provides in part: "10-When used in this section,
and for the purpose of this section: (a) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out
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of the shopkeeper's leasing and servicing agreement with the manufacturer. In
the Muller case, the burglar alarm system had been serviced for almost five
years by union help. But no labor of any kind was performed after the labor
contract between the Union and the lessor Company expired.'5 Upon the
shopkeeper's refusal to hire members of the Union to service the burglar
alarm, the Union picketed his place of business. The majority of the court in
determining that the shopkeeper was a party to the industrial dispute between
the Company and the Union, predicated its argument upon two rather tenuous
tenets: (1) that the maintenance contract established the requisite "unity of
interest" between the manufacturer and the customer of the product; from this
premise the court reasoned, to complete the argument, (2) that this was there-
fore a case involving a "labor dispute."'1 4 The court, moreover, in a strong
dictum argued that peaceful picketing, under circumstances such as those in
the Muller case, is an exercise of the right of free speech, which may not be
denied regardless of the degree of interest of the party picketing.' 5
Unity of Interest
The doctrine of "unity of interest" represents a rather recent development
in the liberal interpretation by the New York courts of the rights of trade
unions in industrial disputes. For years, the question of labor's right to strike
and to advertise their grievances by picketing was coxifined to the employer-
employee relati6nship.' 6  The avenue of liberal thought in the attitude of the
New York Court of Appeals toward picketing was first opened by the case of
Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin.17 But the Court therein was still confronted with
a situation involving only the original.parties to the labor contract; the inno-
cent third party had not yet made his appearance in the picketing cases. The
expression "unity of interest" is used by Judge Brandeis in the case of Duplex
Printing Co. v. Deering's denoting what the New York courts referred to at the
of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry,
trade, craft or occupation, or who are employees of one employer; or who are members
of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees; . . . or when the
case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a 'labor dispute' (as hereinafter
defined) of 'persons participating or interested' therein (as hereinafter defined)."
13. The Muller case, at 286.
14. Judge Lehman, writing for the majority in the Muller case, supports his finding
that a "labor dispute" was here involved by the case of Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y.
281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937); and upon the "restrictive interpretation" given the
(anti-injunction) statute in the recent case of Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348,
34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941).
15. The Muller case, Lehman, Ch. J., at 284. Compare A. F of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S.
321 (1941).
16. Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917); Interborough Rapid Transit
Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928); Stillwell Theatre v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y.
405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932).
17. 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).
18. 254 U. S. 443, 481 (1921). This dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis was later
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time as "common interest",' that is, the interdependence between the members
of the same union,20 or between the employees of the customer and the em-
ployees of the vendor-manufacturer.21 However, one of the earliest uses of this
term in New York was in the case of Goldfinger v. Feintuch.2 2 In that case it
was held that the interdependence between the manufacturer and the retailer
of his products created a relationship which gave the manufacturer's employees
the right to picket the retailer. Such conduct was held to be within that allow-
able area of economic conflict into which the courts would not intervene 23
This case represented a further liberalization of the already progressive atti-
tude of the Court of Appeals in cases involving industrial disputes, as expressed
in the case of Stilwell Theatre v. Kaplan.24
"Thus the judges of a great tribuial indicate their conviction that when
dealing with legal problems enmeshed in dynamic social forces courts ought to
decide only the case before them and to remain open to all the wisdom the
future may hold." 25
The Goldfinger decision, handed down shortly after the enactment of the
New York anti-injunction statute,26 went even further than the court in the
Stilwell Theatre case, and in the spirit of the new statute, held that the em-
ployer-employee relationship was not the sine qua non of the courts power to
interfere for the purpose of denying injunctive relief against peaceful picket-
ing.27 Thus, despite restrictive language, necessitated by the fact that the court
in the Goldfinger case, was dealing with the interpretation of a "labor dispute"
statute, and not with broad common law principles, as in the case of Stilwell
Theatre v. Kaplan, the Goldfinger case continued the liberal trend of the Court
of Appeals in dealing with the right to picket. The definition of "unity of in-
terest", defining the area of union activity in a labor dispute, which was posed
by the Court of Appeals in the Goldfinger and subsequent decisions, naturally
crystallized as the federal policy in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, supra, note 12, and for-
mally adopted by the majority of the United States Supreme Court. Cf. Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prod., 311 U. S. 91 (1940); Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1941); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S.
219 (1941).
19. Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917).
20. National Protective Ass'n v. Cummings, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902).
21. Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917).
22. 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937). Accord: People v. Bergstein, 286 N. Y.
613, 36 N. E. (2d) 454 (1941); Baillis v. Fuchs, 283 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. (2d) 812 (1940).
23. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 286, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, 913 (1937). Cf.
also May's Furs & Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. (2d) 279 (1940).
24. 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (193 ).
25. FRANKFURTER AND GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 42.
26. N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT, § 876-a. Under the statute no injunction may be granted
restraining peaceful picketing of "parties to a labor dispute" as defined therein.
27. Cf. Finch, J., in Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 287, 11 N. E. (2d) 910,
913 (1937).
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led to some difficulties of interpretation by the lower courts when they at-
tempted to apply the definition to original fact situations. The lower courts,
faced with the problem of determining whether there was a sufficient "unity of
interest" necessary to support a determination that a "labor dispute" existed
between the parties to the controversy before the court, reached very different
conclusions in applying the test established by the highest court of the State. 28
The Next Step
In People v. Muller, the majority of the court adopted a very broad interpre-
tation of the statute.29 The dictum of the court indicates an even more liberal
disposition of the problem. For to adopt the dictum in the Muller case, to the
effect that peaceful picketing is an exercise of "free speech" and may not be
enjoined whether the requisite "labor dispute" is present or not, is to render
practically nugatory the provisions of the anti-injunction statute relative to
peaceful picketing.30 The anti-injunction statute proposed to put an end to
the issuance of injunctions prohibiting labor from exercising its lawful rights&a
Therefore, the legislators provided that no injunction' restraining lawful labor
objectives could be issued by the courts if there was a finding that a labor dis-
pute existed. The dictum in the Muller case places peaceful picketing and
other lawful labor objectives within the protection of the Constitutional guar-
antee of "free speech", 32 and thus if followed would render unnecessary the
finding of a "labor dispute".
The Court of Appeals had already taken the occasion in the Goldfinger case
to extend the recently enacted anti-injunction statute beyond its actual lan-
guage.33 The case is authority for the rule that injunctive relief against picket-
ing should be denied not only in cases where the parties were in the same trade
or industry,34 (as the statute provides), but wherever a "unity of interest" is
found to exist between the parties to the litigation.3 The Goldfinger case was
28. Hydrox Ice-Cream Co. v. Doe, 159 Misc. 642, 289 N. Y. Supp. 683 (1936);
Davega-City Radio v. Randau, 166 Misc. 246, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 514 (1938); American
Gas Stations v. Doe, 250 App. Div. 227, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1019 (1937); Abeles v. Friedman,
171 Misc. 1042, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 252 (1939); Strauss v. Steiner, 173 Misc. 521, 18 N. Y. S.
(2d) 395 (1940).
29. The applicable provisions of the statute are set out supra, note 12.
30. If peaceful picketing is prohibited because the controversy does not involve a
"labor dispute", the main question, still to be determined, is whether the peaceful picketing
is not an exercise of the right of free speech. A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 326
(1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
31. Greater City M. P. Ass'n. v. Kahme, 167 Misc. 861, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 589 (1938).
32. U. S. CONST., AmEwD. XIV.
33. See supra, note 12.
34. In this connection compare Columbia River Packers Ass'n. v. Hinton, 314 U. S. 600,
62 Sup. Ct. 520 (1942).
35. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 286, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, 913 (1937). Note
that although the facts of the Goldfinger case fall within the requirements of the statute
1942]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
cited as authority for the finding of a "unity of interest" in the Muller case,
although in the latter case the complainant was not a retailer of the vendor-
manufacturer's product, but a consumer of the product and the service inci-
dental to the maintenance thereof.3 6
In People v. Bellows,3T the Court was faced with a situation quite similar to
that involved in the Muller case, except that in the former case there was a sale
plus a servicing agreement, and in the latter case there was a leasing plus a
servicing agreement, of the non-union product. The majority of the court held
in the Bell6ws case that the consumer of a neon sign was in "no such unity of
interest with the manufacturer as was developed in the Goldfinger case."3 8
Judge Lehman in his opinion in the Muller case does not cite the Bellows deci-
sion, and it is therefore reasonably to be assumed that he adopted, or at least
did not disapprove, the distinction drawn by the Appellate Part of Special
Sessions.89 The two cases were distinguished by the Appellate Part upon the
criterion that in the Bellows case there had been a sale of the product (plus an
incidental servicing arrangement), while in the Muller case the complainant
had only leased (plus an incidental servicing arrangement) the burglar alarm
system.4° This differentiation is difficult to understand if we consider that in
both these cases the picketing was directed against the maintenance and serv-
icing, rather than the sale or leasing of the product,41 although the picketing
was designed to affect adversely the business of the third party generally. 42
To contrast these two cases upon the test that there was a passage of title in
one case and a retention of title by the manufacturer in the other brings to
light the interesting question of how the court would decide if in the Muller case
there was a conditional sale rather than a lease of the burglar alarm system.
By the same reasoning employed in the Muller case, it could be held, to state
the reductio, that all the subscribers of the telephone company or any public
utility might be subjected to picketing whenever a labor dispute arose between
the public utility and its employees. 43 The attempt of the union in the Muller
for the presence of a labor dispute, the effect of the decision was to pave the way for
the establishment of "unity of interest" as the principle, if not the sole criterion deter-
mining the presence or absence of a labor dispute. Cf. Wohl v. Bakery & Pastry Drivers
Union, 284 N. Y. 788, 31 N. E. (2d) 765 (1940), rev'd 314 U. S. 701, 62 Sup. Ct. 816
(1942). Cf. also, Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941) cert.
denied 314 U. S. 615, 62 Sup. Ct. 96 (1942).
36. The Muller case, at 284.
37. 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. (2d) 238 (1939).
38. Id. at 71.
39. People v. Muller, 174 Misc. 872, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
40. Id. at 874. This argument is used by judge Callaghan, and its basis rests in the
court's conclusion that the retention of title in the manufacturer by virtue of the leasing
agreement causes the unity of interest between the Union and the Company to follow the
product (still the property of the Company) into the hands of the lessor.
41. Cf. the Muller case, at 283 (par. 5, stipulated facts).
42. Id. at 286.
43. Horn, M., Decision annexed to return, People v. Muller, Papers on Appeal 67.
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case to force the subscriber of a burglar-alarm system into breaching his bind-
ing, legal obligation with the Company44 supplying the system, amounts to an
infringement of his constitutional right of freedom of contract4V and can only be
justified by evidence of a superior right in the Union responsible for the picket-
ing.46 And it is not a sufficient safeguard to complainant's rights to say that he
has equal opportunity for publication of his side of the question. If the com-
plainant acceded to the Union's demands he would have to subject himself to a
right of action for damages by the lessor Company, unless the Union was suc-
cessful in its prosecution of the strike.47 All that complainant could have done
lawfully to assist the cause of the picketers would have been to exert moral
pressure on the Company, by threatening to discontinue his contract with the
Company at the expiration of the year. Even if the complainant had insisted
on provision in his contract for Union servicing and maintenance, he would have
no protection in the event of a so-called "cross-picketing" in a jurisdictional
dispute.48 It is interesting to note, moreover, that if complainant had acceded
to the Union's demands he might easily have created just such a situation, and
would be subjected to cross-picketing as well as to a right of action by the Com-
pany for breach of contract.49
There is much to be said for the academic argument that the labor level in
both the Muller and Bellows cases has converged with the marketing level and
consequently the "unity of interest" continues throughout the period of serv-
icing, the industrial relationship on the labor level being part and parcel of the
marketing system in the industry. However, the New York court does not
consider the argument in the Muller case.
"Parties To A Labor Dispute"
The New York anti-injunction statute acts to restrain any infringement of
the right to picket wherever it is shown that the requisite conditions are present.
44. The stipulated facts concede that by the shopkeeper's contract with the Company
for maintenance and servicing of the burglar alarm system, the shopkeeper covenanted to
allow no one to service the system save the Company. The Muller case, at 283 (stipulated
facts).
45. Cf. Lehman, J., in I. R. T. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 82, 159 N. E. 863, 869 (1928).
46. Cf. Cotillo, J., Busch jewelry Co. v. United Retail, etc. Union, 168 Misc. 224, 233,
5 N. Y. S. (2d) 575, 583 (1938).
47. The Muller case, Finch, J., dissenting at 286.
48. The anti-injunction statute includes within the definition of a "labor dispute" a
controversy "between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or
more employees or associations of employees." N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT, § 876-a, subd. 10(a).
49. If the complainant had hired the Union, a member of the A. F. of L. to do the
work, he would have made himself the employer of the Union, and hence directly liable
to picketing by a rival union seeking to represent the members of the Union. United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941). A similar situation is found in the case of
Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674 (1937), in which the right of
picketing by a rival union is upheld.
1942]
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The principal requirements of the statute are (1) that a "labor dispute" be
found, (2) between "parties to a labor dispute." 50 It may be true that in the
Muller case there was a "labor dispute" between the Company and the Union,
but it is difficult to surmise how it can reasonably be asserted that the com-
plainant shopkeeper was a "party to the labor dispute," either under the word-
ing of the statute,5 - or under the broad interpretation already given by the
New York courts in such cases. Hence, the court seems to have neglected the
second requisite above, and decided the case simply upon a finding of the
primary iequisite of a "unity of interest". In so holding the court has denied
complainant a remedy for what was previously held to be a substantive wrong,
and thereby changed the substantive law to this extent.52 The result denies
complainant, or any third party indirectly involved in a labor controversy, a
remedy to prevent unlawful picketing, whether relief be sought in law or in
equity,53 by declaring all peaceful picketing lawful. Such a holding is ques-
tionable when the picketing involves interference with the property rights of
innocent third parties to the dispute.
Innocents Immune from Picketing?
To what extreme may these weapons of labor be used against third parties
who are not principals to the original controversy? If the courts would deter-
mine, after they have found a "unity of interest" in an industrial dispute,
whether the parties to the litigation were "parties to the labor dispute" under
the wording of the statute, they could resolve this question.
It should be mentioned in passing that there was no work being performed
on the burglar alarm system in the Muller case, when the picketing began, or
for some time prior to the commencement of the picketing. 54  We would un-
doubtedly be confronted with quite a different question if the burglar alarm
was being serviced by the use of non-union labor or any other labor which was
unfair to the employees of the Company who were striking. Likewise, if there
had been non-union servicing of the system shortly before the picketing began,
although the question would be more difficult of determination, the courts
would probably be justified in allowing the picketing as "organizational." 55
50. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 876-a, subd. 10.
51. Id. at subd. 10(b).
52. Crane, J., in People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 77, 22 N. E. (2d) 238, 242 (1939).
53. The anti-injunction statute prohibits the issuance of an injunction restraining peace-
ful picketing in a labor dispute. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 876-a, subd. 1 (f-5, 7). By hold-
ing that peaceful picketing may not be enjoined or considered disorderly conduct regard-
less of the degree of interest of the parties, the Court holds in effect, that peaceful picketing
may never be restrained either in law or in equity. The Muller case, at 284. Such a hold-
ing likewise overrules Katzman v. Kirkman, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 903 (1940). The Katzman
case was an identical fact situation in which the complainant obtained an injunction against
picketing in front of his premises, regardless of whether the picketing was peaceful or not.
54. The Muller case, at 283 (par. 9, stipulated facts).
55. Cf. Andrews, J., Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 263, 157 N. E. 130, 132
(1927), upholding labor union's right to picket in attempting to "organize" a concern.
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The Court of Appeals in the Muller case was precluded from a decision based
solely on the wording of the criminal statute under which the defendant was
tried by the holding in the Bellows case that peaceful picketing which consti-
tutes a secondary boycott against a person who has no unity of interest with
one involved in a labor dispute does constitute "disorderly conduct".16 A
sounder rule would require complainant not in "unity of interest" with the
Union to seek his remedy in equity by injunction, rather than by resort to the
criminal statute, which was hardly enacted to prevent peaceful picketing.
Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech
Is peaceful picketing by the members of a union in front of a business served
by the union the exercise of the right of free speech guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution?57 Even in this most liberal New York decision, People v. Muller,
and in the numerous and unprecedentedly liberal decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in recent cases involving picketing in labor disputes, there are
only strong dicta to support this interpretation of the constitutional guarantee
as applied to labor controversies."8 It has never been decided, at least up to
the date of this writing, by either the United States Supreme Court or the Court
of Appeals of New York, that the constitutional provisions relative to freedom
of speech prevent any restraint being placed on the right of peaceful picketing
where there is no "interdependence of economic interest," or "unity of interest"
of any kind.59 It is true, however, that the trend of the decisions as well as the
dicta in the cases point in the direction of such a holding.
What will be the course of decisions in the future? That is not too difficult
to say. If the present trend continues, and the war does not seem likely to
change the liberal temper of the New York Court of Appeals toward labor con-
troversies, the court will probably declare that peaceful picketing by a union,
in order to advertise their grievance against a party, is an exercise of the right
of free speech, and may not be prohibited regardless of whether there is a
"unity of interest" between the parties to the litigation or not.c0 Thus the
court will announce as decisive, that which they are presently asserting as dicta
with increasing conviction. The advent of such a holding by the New York
Courts may be foreshadowed in the words of Justice Frankfurter in the United
States Supreme Court case of A. F. of L. v. Swing: "The scope of the 14th
Amendment is not confined by the notion of a particular state regarding the
wise limits of an injunction in an industrial dispute, whether those limits be
defined by statute or by the judicial organ of the state."'O1 The pendulum of
56. People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 77, 22 N. E. (2d) 238, 242 (1939).
57. Cf. Murphy, J., in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95 (1940).
58. A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadow-
moor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1941); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm
Products, 311 U. S. 91 (1940).
59. The recent Supreme Court cases proclaiming the freedom of speech in industrial
disputes were all decided upon a finding of interdependence of economic interest. Milk
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